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ABSTRACT: In March this year, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter “CJ”) 
answered the first preliminary question regarding the Private Enforcement Directive 
(“Directive”).1 One might expect this decision2 to remain relevant for the next few 
years, as it sheds some light on the rather intricate issue of the Directive’s temporal 
application. The CJ explains what rules are applicable to actions for damages regard-
ing infringements which occurred prior either to the Directive’s adoption or to its 
implementation in the respective Member States. The case is also of major interest 
since it illustrates the role that the principle of effectiveness can play when applied 
alongside Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”).3 Finally, albeit not expressly addressed, the case is also of interest regard-
ing the controversial issue of parent company liability in private enforcement, where 
it represents a novelty in the Portuguese legal order. 
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1 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014, on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competi-
tion law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, [2014] OJ L 349, 1–19.
2 Judgment of 28 March 2019, Cogeco Communications Inc v. Sport TV Portugal SA et al., C-637/17, 
EU:C:2019:263. 
3 This case deals only with article 102 but the consequences that can be derived regarding the prin-
ciple of effectiveness can also be applied to infringements of article 101. 
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I. Facts of the case
In June 2013, the Portuguese Competition Authority (“PCA”) adopted a 
decision4 holding that Sport TV Portugal, SA (“Sport TV”), a sports-ori-
ented premium cable and satellite television network, had abused its domi-
nant position through the practice of discriminatory prices, thereby simul-
taneously infringing EU5 and national competition law.6 This decision was 
adopted following a complaint filed in 2009 by Cabovisão – Televisão por 
Cabo, SA (“Cabovisão”), a company which offers subscription based tel-
evision services in Portugal. At the time, Cabovisão was held by Cogeco 
Communications Inc. (“Cogeco”), a Canadian based company which exer-
cised, directly or indirectly, exclusive control over the former. 
In the appeal to the Portuguese Competition Court,7 Sport TV man-
aged to get a partial annulment of the PCA’s decision. According to this 
Court, the PCA was right in finding that Sport TV’s conduct had infringed 
national competition law, but it held that there had been no violation of 
Article 102 TFEU, since the abusive conduct was not capable of affecting 
trade between Member States. This decision was confirmed by the Court 
of Appeal.8 
In February 2015, Cogeco brought a follow-on action against Sport TV 
and its two joint-controlling shareholders demanding compensation for 
the damages suffered by its subsidiary, Cabovisão, as a result of Sport TV’s 
anti-competitive practices. 
In the meantime, in November 2014, the EU signed into law the Private 
Enforcement Directive, setting out rules to ensure that anyone who had 
suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law could effec-
tively exercise the right to claim full compensation for that harm. Member 
States had until the end of December 2016 to implement the Directive. 
Portugal failed to comply with this deadline and only transposed the 
Directive in June 2018, being the last Member State to do so.9
In the follow-on action brought by Cogeco, the defendants argued that 
under Portuguese civil law it could no longer demand compensation for 
4 Decision no. PCR-02/2010 of 14 of June 2013.
5 Article 102 TFEU.
6 Article 6 of Law no. 18/2003 of 11 of June, establishing the legal regime of competition. Diário da 
República no.134/2003, I-A of 2003-06-11.
7 Tribunal da Concorrência, Regulação e Supervisão.
8 Judgment of Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa of 11 of March 2015, Cogeco Communications v. Sport 
TV et al., Proc. no. 5754/15.7T8LSB. 
9 Law 23/2018 of 6 June 2018, Diário da República no.107/2018, I of 2018-06-05. 
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the harm suffered. It was time-barred from doing so since the applicable 
limitation-period had expired. Cogeco, relying on the Private Enforcement 
Directive, claimed it was still possible to seek damages since the limitation 
period had only begun to run after the PCA had published its decision fin-
ing Sport TV. 
II.  The contentious issues: limitation periods, effects of 
administrative decisions and the temporal application of  
the Directive
(A) Limitation periods 
Limitation periods serve various different aims. First of all, they ensure 
legal certainty, reducing uncertainty to debtors, who would otherwise 
be constantly under the threat of being sued over a particular matter. 
They also have a practical justification: limiting the time to initiate legal 
action contributes to a more effective functioning of the judicial system. 
Limitation periods encourage potential creditors to start proceedings 
sooner rather than later, which will probably lead to fewer evidentiary dif-
ficulties. Furthermore, unsettled claims have a disturbing effect on trade, 
therefore limitation periods serve to minimise this effect by motivating 
parties to settle their disputes faster.10 
Private enforcement of competition law brings its own set of challenges to 
limitation periods.11 These play a critical role in this context and are there-
fore one of the focal points of the Directive. Clear rules on prescription 
contribute to an optimal interaction between public and private enforce-
ment. Uniform rules on limitation periods constitute a crucial component 
in the creation of an even European playing-field in actions for damages 
for competition law infringements.12 
10 Marian Hoeks, “Tick, Tock: Limitation Periods in Transport Law”, European Journal of 
Commercial Contract Law 11 (2015): 11. Nathalie des Rosiers, “Canada”, in Extinctive Prescription 
on the Limitation of Actions, ed. Ewoud Hondius (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995), 94. 
11 Katri Havu, “Limitation periods in damages claims: Notes on a Finnish Supreme Court prece-
dent in the context of the european landscape”, Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 
7, no. 6 (2016): 401. See also recital 36 of the Directive.
12 Ana Vlahek and Klemen Podobnik, “Provisions of the Damages Directive on Limitation Periods 
and their implementation in CEE countries”, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 15 
(2017): 149-150.
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The issue of limitation periods in private enforcement had already been 
addressed by the CJ in the Manfredi case.13 In this preliminary ruling, 
adopted nearly a decade before the Directive, the Court had held that, 
in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it was for each 
Member State to prescribe the limitation period for seeking compensa-
tion, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness were 
observed. In this case, the Italian court had to decide whether a rule which 
provided that the limitation period started to run from the day on which 
the prohibited agreement or practice was adopted, and which imposed a 
short limitation period that could not be suspended, rendered it practically 
impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the right to seek compensa-
tion for the harm suffered.14
In Portuguese civil law, claimants have a period of three years to seek 
compensation for the damages suffered. According to the applicable rule 
– article 498 of the Portuguese Civil Code – the limitation period starts to 
run from the date on which the injured party was aware of its right to seek 
damages, regardless of whether it knew the identity of the infringer15 or the 
13 Judgment of 13 July 2006, Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni, Antonio Cannito 
v. Fondiaria Sai and Nicolò Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v. Assitalia, joined cases C-295/04 
to C-298/04, EU:C:2006:461. 
14 Another recent case from Finland further illustrates the difficulty in determining when the 
limitation period to bring an action for damages starts to run and the role that the principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence play in that determination. This case, however, remained within 
the national jurisdiction, and was object of a preliminary ruling. In this case, the Finnish Act on 
Competition Restrictions established a 5 year limitation period to initiate damages proceedings 
from the date the injured party “knew or should have known the damage”. The Helsinki District 
Court held that the limitation period had started to run when the Finnish Competition Authority 
had first published information on the investigations it was conducting on the cartel. The Helsinki 
Appellate Court overturned this decision since it considered that the limitation period only began 
to run when the Market Court adopted a final decision recognising the existence of an infringe-
ment of national and EU competition law. The Supreme Court did not agree with either of the other 
courts and decided that the timeframe had begun in-between, when the Finnish Competition 
Authority submitted a written proposal to the Market Court to impose a fine on the undertak-
ings concerned for their involvement in the antitrust infringement. The Supreme Court consid-
ered that it was at this moment that the injured party had access to the information necessary to 
evaluate if he had suffered damages and the level of such damages and make a decision on whether 
compensation proceedings should be initiated. This interpretation assured that the national rules 
were aligned with the EU principles of effectiveness and equivalence. Havu, “Limitation Periods 
in Damages Claims”. 
15 Regarding this issue the Portuguese regime is different from most of the other European tort law 
systems which require knowledge about the identity of the tortfeasor for the limitation period to 
start running. For instance, in Austria (§ 1489 Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), in Belgium 
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total amount of damages suffered. Furthermore, there is no norm under 
Portuguese law specifically determining or authorising the suspension or 
interruption of the limitation period based upon the fact that the PCA is 
investigating the infringement to which the action for damages relates. 
In contrast, article 10 of the Directive states that Member States are 
required to establish limitation periods with a minimum duration of five 
years, which cannot begin to run before the infringement has ceased16 and 
the claimant knows, or could reasonably be expected to know, (i.) about 
the behaviour and that it constitutes an infringement, (ii.) the fact that he 
or she has suffered harm due to infringement, and (iii.) the identity of the 
infringer. The Directive also demands the suspension or interruption of 
the limitation period while the competition authority is investigating or 
running proceedings in respect to the competition law infringement to 
which the action for damages relates.
(B) Effects of administrative decisions
Another issue under discussion in the case was the question of the effects 
of the decision of the competition authority. Prior to the implementation 
of the Directive, Portugal did not have a specific norm regulating this 
(Article 2262bis of the Code Civil (inserted first in 1998 [L 1998-06-10/39]), in Croatia (Article 215 
of the Civil Obligations Act), in the Czech Republic, in England (s. 11 of the Limitation Act 1980), 
in Germany (S199 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), in Greece (Article 937 § 1 of the Civil Code), in the 
Netherlands (Article 3:310 Burgerlijk Wetboek); in Poland (Article 442: “§ 1 of the Kodeks Cywilny) 
the limitation period will only start running from the moment the plaintiff has knowledge about 
the identity of the tortfeasor. However, in Spain and in France knowledge of the tortfeasor is dis-
pensable. Whereas in other jurisdictions the limitation period starts to run when the damages 
occurs that is the case in Hungary (s6:22, s6:532, s6:533 of the Civil Code). Information obtained 
in André Pereira, “Limitation Periods - A Comparative Study”, Boletim da Faculdade de Direito da 
Universidade de Coimbra 82 (2006): 587-590 and in Christian Salm, “Limitation periods for road 
traffic accidents”, 2016, under “European Parliament”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/STUD/2016/581386/EPRS_STU(2016)581386_EN.pdf.
16 This reflects the Manfredi case law, where the CJ stated that “a national rule under which the 
limitation period begins to run from the day on which the agreement or concerted practice was 
adopted could make it practically impossible to exercise the right to seek compensation for the 
harm caused by that prohibited agreement or practice, particularly if that national rule also 
imposes a short limitation period which is not capable of being suspended”. The Court added that, 
if the infringement was continuous or repeated, this could lead to a situation where the limitation 
period would expire before the infringement was brought to an end (judgment of 13 July 2006, 
Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni, Antonio Cannito v. Fondiaria Sai and Nicolò 
Tricarico and Pasqualina Murgolo v. Assitalia, joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, EU:C:2006:461, 
paragraphs 78-79). See Vlahek and Podobnik, “Provisions of the Damages Directive on limitation 
periods”, 155.
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issue; article 623 of the Portuguese Code of Civil Proceedings (‘PCCP’) 
was, therefore, applied by analogy. According to this norm, in civil pro-
ceedings where the consequences of an infringement are discussed, a final 
conviction given in a criminal case constitutes, in relation to third parties, 
a rebuttable presumption regarding the existence of such infringement.17 
When transposed to competition law proceedings, this article has two pos-
sible interpretations: either (i.) no effects are attributed to the PCA’s final 
infringement decision, as it is an administrative decision and not a crimi-
nal conviction or (ii.) the PCA’s decision, as it has an analogous nature to 
criminal convictions, constitutes a rebuttable presumption, in relation to 
third parties, regarding the existence of the infringement. 
However, Article 9 no. 1 of the Directive requires Member States to 
ensure that infringements of competition law found by a final decision 
of a national competition authority or by a review court are deemed to 
be irrefutably established for an action for damages brought before their 
national courts. 
(C) Temporal application of the Directive
It is important to bear in mind that the case under analysis referred to 
a dispute between private parties regarding an infringement which took 
place before the Directive was signed into law and the claim for damages 
was lodged during the Directive’s implementation period but prior to its 
transposition into the Portuguese legal order. In this regard, article 22 of 
the Directive provides that national measures adopted to comply with the 
substantive provisions of the Directive cannot be applied retroactively 
and no other national measures (i.e. procedural provisions) can be applied 
to actions for damages of which a national court was seized prior to 26 
December 2014. When transposing the Directive, the Portuguese legisla-
tor stipulated that the substantive provisions contained in the implemen-
tation act, including those relating to the burden of proof, did not apply 
retroactively and the procedural provisions could not be applied to actions 
brought before the national act came into force.18 
17 To be more precise, article 623 states that the criminal conviction constitutes a rebuttable pre-
sumption “as regards the existence of the facts which satisfy the conditions for the imposition of a 
penalty and the elements of an offence”.
18 Article 24 of Law no. 23/2018.
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Faced with these contradictions, the Portuguese court decided to stay 
proceedings and ask the CJ what requirements are, in essence, imposed by 
EU law in actions for damages, between private parties, regarding infringe-
ments that occurred prior to the Directive’s adoption and implementation.
III.  The applicability of Directive 2014/104: substantive vs. 
procedural rules
The CJ limited its assessment to whether the Directive was applicable to 
the case ratione temporis, i.e. whether the temporal requirements of the 
Directive, foreseen in article 22, dictated its application to the case. Having 
reached a negative solution, the CJ considered it unnecessary to analyse the 
applicability of the Directive under the prism of its material requirements. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to take note of the Advocate-General’s 
(“AG”) comments on the applicability of the Directive ratione materiae. 
According to the AG, the Directive can only be relevant to the case if the 
national court decides that the abusive conduct constitutes an infringe-
ment of Article 102 TFEU. If, on the contrary, the national court comes 
to the conclusion that there was no violation of Article 102 TFEU, the 
Directive does not apply. This reasoning results from Articles 1 and 2 
(1) and (3) of the Directive, which limit the material application of the 
Directive to infringements of EU Competition Law. According to these 
norms, the Directive only applies to infringements of national competi-
tion law if its provisions are applied to the same case and in parallel to 
EU competition law. Claims exclusively based in infringements of national 
competition law fall outside the scope of the Directive. The reason for this 
solution lies in the Directive’s ultimate goal, which is to set rules fostering 
undistorted competition in the internal market and remove obstacles to its 
proper functioning. Only cases dealing with infringements that are capa-
ble of affecting trade between Member States are sufficiently related with 
the internal market.19 
Regarding the application of the Directive ratione temporis, as men-
tioned above, article 22 prevents the retroactive application of the substan-
tive measures of the Directive and determines that the procedural meas-
ures cannot be applied to actions for damages of which a national court 
19 Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 17 January 2019, C-637/17, EU:C:2019:32, paragraphs 55-59. 
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was seized prior to the date in which the Directive came into force. The 
aim of this norm is to ensure legal certainty. It strives to strike a balance 
between allowing injured parties’ access to the reformed regime while not 
leaving defendants in an unfair position.20 
However, the Directive does not specify which measures are of a proce-
dural nature and which are substantive. This raises two questions: (i.) how 
do we qualify the nature of a norm? and (ii.) is qualification a matter to be 
solved by EU or by national law? 
(A) The legal nature of rules on limitation periods
National legal orders around the world are strongly divided as regards the 
question of the nature of the norms on limitation periods.21 In Europe, 
rules on limitation periods are deemed, by most Member States, to be 
of a substantive nature, whereas in the UK, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic and Malta, limitation periods are considered to be procedural 
rules.22 The difference between the legal regimes resides in the distinct 
conception of limitation periods. Under the civil law tradition, the course 
of time is generally considered to lead to the extinction of the substantive 
right, while in common law, the limitation period does not affect the exist-
ence of the right, but merely affects its exercise by the respective holder 
– it is therefore fundamentally seen as a question of procedure.23 In the 
words of Lord Sumption of the British Supreme Court, “ limitation, which 
deprives the litigant of a forensic remedy but does not extinguish his right, 
is for that reason classified by the English courts as procedural”.24
In Portugal, as a country of civil law tradition, norms on limitation peri-
ods are considered to have a substantive nature. In Portuguese civil law, 
20 See “Competition policy. Damages for breaches of Competition Law – Government response 
to consultation”, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2016, accessed August 
20, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/577228/damages-directive-consultation-response.pdf. 
21 See Ernest Lorenzen, “The statute of limitations and the conflict of laws”, The Yale Law 
Journal 28, no. 5 (1919): 492.
22 Raúl Sánchez, “Law applicable to cross border road traffic accidents: Negative consequences 
resulting from the absence of harmonization of limitation periods and possible solutions”, Anuario 
Español de Derecho Internacional Privado 18 (2018): 510-511.
23 Raúl Sánchez, “Law applicable to cross border road traffic accidents”, 510-511; Reinhard 
Zimmermann, Comparative Foundations of a European Law of Set-Off and Prescription 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 69-75.
24 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 May 2016, Ministry of Defence v. Iraqi Civilians, [2016] 
UKSC 25, 2. 
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limitation periods are deemed to be part of the characteristics that inform 
the material legal relationship between creditor and debtor. They cannot 
be reduced to procedural requirements, since limitation rules determine 
the permanent cessation of a right. Limitation periods, in civil law, are 
therefore classified as a causa extintiva de direitos.25 
The same can be said about limitation periods in the realm of Portuguese 
criminal law. They are also deemed to be part of substantive and not pro-
cedural law.26 Procedural norms express procedural requirements upon 
which the exercise of the judicial function depends. They ensure that deci-
sions are adopted in a fair way and that unnecessary or useless decisions 
are avoided. Non-compliance with procedural requirements prevents the 
court from deciding on the merits or the substance of the case. Limitation 
periods do not fall under this classification. Instead, they are deemed to be 
a causa extintiva of criminal liability. In other words, the passage of time 
leads to the extinguishment of criminal liability. Even though limitation 
rules do not contribute to the definition or the delimitation of a criminal 
infringement, they affect the finding of criminal liability. Consequently, 
the principle of legality, in particular the non-retroactive application of 
criminal law, applies to norms regulating limitation periods. 
Regarding the nature of norms on limitation periods under EU law, the 
CJ does not have an extensive decisional practice and has never, as far as 
we could find out, delved in depth in the analysis of this matter. A num-
ber of cases in the realm of state aid and tax law dealing with limitation 
25 This expression can be roughly translated as events leading to the cessation of rights. Carlos 
da Mota Pinto, Teoria Geral do Direito Civil (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2012), 373; António 
Menezes Cordeiro, Tratado de Direito Civil (Coimbra: Almedina, 2011), 171-172; José Miguel 
Bezerra, Sampaio e Nora and João de Matos Antunes Varela, Manual de Processo Civil (Coimbra: 
Coimbra Editora, 2006), 297-298. 
26 In the words of José de Faria Costa, “legal rules regarding the expiry of the criminal proce-
dure have mainly a material and not a procedural or adjective nature. This can be said principally 
because these norms by affecting, directly and invasively, the very personal sphere of the citizen 
and, in a certain way, as a result, some fundamental rights – such as the fundamental right to legal 
peace, among others – cannot be considered, by the very nature of things, as having a material 
nature” in José de Faria Costa, “O Direito Penal e o tempo”, Direito 11, no. 1 (2002): 121. Figueiredo 
Dias also follows this dominant reasoning, however the author adopts a more hybrid approach 
as he draws a distinction between limitation rules regarding the criminal procedure and limita-
tion rules regarding the extinction of the sanction. See Jorge de Figueiredo Dias, Direito Penal 
Português, As Consequências Jurídicas do Crime (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2009), 700-701.
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periods for the recovery of unduly paid sums seem to point to the proce-
dural nature of these rules. 
The problem of determining the nature of legal norms has emerged where 
the EU judicature had to rule on the temporal application of the law, as 
“according to settled case-law, procedural rules are generally held to apply 
to all proceedings pending at the time when they enter into force, whereas 
substantive rules are usually interpreted as not applying, in principle, to 
situations existing before their entry into force”.27 Substantive rules will 
only apply “to situations existing before their entry into force only in so 
far as it clearly follows from their terms, objectives or general scheme that 
such an effect must be given to them”.28 As such, in Ireland and Aughinish 
Alumina v. Commission,29 for instance, the CJ held that Article  15 of 
Regulation No. 659/1999, which established a limitation period of 10 years 
for the Commission to exercise its powers to recover unlawful aid,30 was a 
procedural rule and, therefore, applicable from the time of that provision’s 
entry into force. Even though, in this case, the aid had been granted before 
the entry into force of the relevant norm, the decision to recover that aid 
had the effect of starting the limitation period laid down in that article, as 
the decision had been taken after the entry into force of the article.31
27 Judgment of 24 February 1987, Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft Ehrhardt-Renken v. 
Commission, Case 312/84, EU:C:1987:9423, paragraph 4; Judgment of 23 February 2006, Belgische 
Staat v. Molenbergnatie, C-201/04, EU:C:2006:136, paragraph  31; Judgment of 6 July 1993, CT 
Control (Rotterdam) and JCT Benelux v. Commission, joined cases C-121/91 and C-122/91, 
EU:C:1993:285, paragraph 22; Judgment of 7 September 1999, De Haan Beheer v. Inspecteur der 
Invoerrechten en Accijnzen te Rotterdam, C-61/98, EU:C:1999:393, paragraph 13; and Judgment of 
14 November 2002, Ilumitrónica – Iluminação e Electrónica v. Chefe da Divisão de Procedimentos 
Aduaneiros e Fiscais/Direcção das Alfândegas de Lisboa, and Ministério Público, C-251/00, 
EU:C:2002:655, paragraph 29. See Juha Raitio, “Legal Certainty, Non-Retroactivity and Periods of 
Limitation in EU Law”, Legisprudence 2, no. 1 (2008):11.
28 Judgment of 12 November 1981, Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Srl Meridionale 
Industria Salumi et al.; Ditta Italo Orlandi & Figlio and Ditta Vincenzo Divella v. Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Stato, joined cases 212 to 217/80, EU:C:1981:270, paragraph 9.
29 Judgment of 22 of April 2016, Ireland and Aughinish Alumina v. Commission, joined Cases 
T-50/06 RENV II and T-69/06 RENV II, EU:T:2016:227, paragraphs 172-173.
30 Council Regulation (EC) No. 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, [1999] OJ L 83, 1-9. This Regulation is no longer in force, 
it has been repealed and replaced by Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 TFEU, [2015] OJ L 248, 9-29. This Regulation 
also foresees a 10 year limitation period for the Commission to exercise its powers of recovery in 
article 17, no. 1.
31 Under discussion in cases Aprile v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato (judgment of 17 
November 1998, C-228/96, EU:C:1998:544) and Dilexport v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello 
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When applying the abovementioned principle of temporal application 
of EU norms, the Court tends to affirm tout court that the norm at issue 
is of a procedural or substantive nature. The Court has never explained or 
developed criteria to justify why it considers that the relevant norms fall 
into a particular category.32 
Stato (judgment of 9 February 1999, C-343/96, EU:C:1999:59) was an Italian norm on the repay-
ment of taxes recognised to be incompatible with Community law. The said norm reduced the 
limitation period to bring refund claims from 5 to 3 years. The CJ considered that the interpre-
tation followed by Italian courts, which allowed proceedings to be instituted within the three 
years following the entry into force of the norm, could not be regarded as having retroactive effect 
(paragraph 28 in Aprile and paragraph 42 in Dilexport). Furthermore, in paragraph 42, the CJ 
specifically referred to the said norm as a “procedural rule”. This reasoning was also applied in 
cases Marks & Spencer v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise (Judgment of 11 July 2002, C-62/00, 
EU:C:2002:435, paragraph 38) and Grundig Italiana v. Ministero delle Finanze (Judgment of 24 
September 2002, C-255/00, EU:C:2002:525, paragraphs 36-38), where the CJ reaffirmed that 
national legislation which reduces the period within which repayment of sums collected in breach 
of Community law may be sought is not incompatible with the principle of effectiveness, as long 
as the new limitation period is reasonable, but also that the new legislation includes transitional 
arrangements allowing an adequate period after the enactment of the legislation for lodging the 
claims for repayment which persons were entitled to submit under the original legislation.
32 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has also drawn important consequences from the 
dichotomy of substantive v. procedural measures (see Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99). The ICJ has gone 
further than the CJ in trying to define both categories of norms, but the explanations remain quite 
brief. In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the ICJ stated that a rule which is procedural in 
nature “regulates the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of particular conduct and is thus entirely 
distinct from the substantive law which determines whether that conduct is lawful or unlawful”. 
As commented by Stefan Talmon (“Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and procedural 
rules distinguished”, Leiden Journal of International Law no. 25, Bonn Research Papers on Public 
International Law, no. 4 (2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2085271), this is a too narrow under-
standing of procedural rules. Rules on jurisdiction certainly are one example of procedural rules, 
and the one that the ICJ was concerned with in this case, but these are not the only type of such 
rules. 
Scholars have essentially developed three different tests to determine the nature of a norm. (i) A 
formal-functional test, which examines what the norm itself regulates. If it rules only the manner 
by which rights are exercised, it is of a procedural nature, if it alters the rules of the decision by 
which the court will attribute those rights, then it is substantive. (ii) An outcome-determinative 
test, which looks at the degree to which the rule affects the legal outcome and the litigants’ rights. 
The rule will be deemed to have a substantial nature if it significantly affects the result of the litiga-
tion. (iii) A purposive test, which considers the purpose of the rule. The rule will be procedural if 
that is its aim, for example if it strives for adjudication efficiency or fact-finding accuracy, whereas 
the rule will be considered substantive if its aims relate to policy considerations and not to the 
administration of the legal process (Ofer Malcai and Ronit Levine-Schnur, “Which Came First, the 
Procedure or the Substance? Justificational Priority and the Substance – Procedure Distinction”, 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 34, no. 1 (2014): 4.
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The famous Taricco saga, which deals with limitation periods in the con-
text of criminal law, sheds some very interesting clues in this context.
The first Taricco case was a preliminary ruling initiated by the Italian 
Constitutional Court which raised the question of whether the rules of its 
criminal code on limitation periods prevented Italy from complying with 
its obligations flowing from Article 325 TFEU, which imposes on Member 
States the obligation to counter fraudulent or illegal activities affecting the 
financial interests of the EU. The Italian criminal code rules on limita-
tion periods and their respective interruptions were rather lenient, which 
meant a de facto impunity of criminal agents of VAT fraud.33 The CJ con-
sidered that Italy would not be complying with its the obligations imposed 
by the Treaty if its national rules prevented the imposition of effective and 
dissuasive penalties in a significant number of cases of serious fraud affect-
ing the financial interests of the EU or if the national norms violated the 
principle of equivalence by providing longer limitation periods regarding 
cases of fraud affecting national financial interests than regarding those 
affecting the financial interests of the EU. National courts were said to be 
under the obligation to give full effect to Article 325 by, need-be, disapply-
ing said provisions of national law.
The CJ’s decision was a source of major turmoil in the Italian legal order. 
Italian criminal rules on limitation periods are considered to have a sub-
stantive character. National courts doubted whether the disapplication of 
these rules, as required by the CJ’s ruling, could signify a violation of the 
principle of legality, which requires criminal rules to be precise and pre-
vents their retroactive application.34 The Constitutional Court therefore 
decided to refer another preliminary question asking, in essence, whether 
national courts, in criminal proceedings, are required to disapply national 
provisions on limitation periods when such disapplication entails a breach 
33 Specifically, Article 160 of the Italian Penal Code contained a rule according to which the limita-
tion period could in no case be extended by more than a quarter of its initial duration. Given the 
complexity and duration of criminal proceedings in relation to value added tax offences, the rule 
had the effect of neutralising the temporal effect of an event interrupting the limitation period.
34 The decision of the CJ in Tarico I also ran counter to previous case-law of the Italian Constitutional 
court, which had expressly held that limitation periods were substantive criminal norms and, 
therefore, the constitutional principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law applied to provisions 
regulating limitation periods. Matteo Bonneli, “The Taricco saga and the consolidation of judicial 
dialogue in the European Union: CJEU, C-105/14 Ivo Taricco and others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:555; 
and C-42/17 M.A.S., M.B., ECLI:EU:C:2017:936 Italian Constitutional Court, Order no. 24/2017”, 
Maastricht Journal of European and Competition Law 25, no. 3 (2018), 361.
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of the principle of legality due to the lack of precision of the applicable law 
or due to its retroactive application.35
AG Bot was of the opinion that Italian courts had no choice but to disap-
ply the national provisions. The AG argued that the concept of interrup-
tion of limitation periods had to be considered as an autonomous concept 
of EU law. By defining the principle of legality by reference to Article 49 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the AG came to the conclu-
sion that the extension of limitation periods did not entail a violation of the 
rights of the defendant. The AG referred to the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”),36 according to which the principle of 
legality37 is satisfied when the individual can, from the relevant provisions, 
infer what acts or omissions will make him criminally liable. Restrictions 
on retroactivity apply only to norms which define criminal offences and 
the penalties imposed. Norms on limitation periods are of a procedural 
nature, therefore they can be applied immediately to pending proceedings.
The CJ did not follow the AG’s opinion, choosing to follow a more con-
ciliatory road. It started, however, by reiterating its decision in Tarico I, 
highlighting that national courts, in order to give full effect to their obliga-
tions under Article 325 TFEU, have to disapply norms – including those 
on limitation periods – which prevent the application of effective and 
dissuasive penalties needed to counter fraudulent activities affecting the 
financial interests of the EU. According to the CJ, it is the role of the legis-
lator to devise rules enabling the respective Member State to comply with 
its obligations under the Treaty. In that regard, an extension of the limita-
tion period, introduced by national legislation, and its immediate applica-
tion does not – in principle – entail a violation of the principle of legality. 
However, when deciding to disapply rules of the national criminal code, 
Italian courts are required to ensure that the fundamental rights of the 
35 According to some authors, more than a clarification, the preliminary request was an 
attempt to avoid a constitutional collision between the two legal orders. Federico Fabbrini and 
Oreste Pollicino, “Constitutional identity in Italy: European integration as the fulfilment of the 
Constitution”, European University Institute Working Papers (2017): http://cadmus.eui.eu/bit-
stream/handle/1814/45605/LAW_2017_06.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
36 Judgment of the ECHR of 22  June 2000, Coëme and Others v. Belgium, CE:ECHR:2000: 
0622JUD003249296; judgment of the ECHR of 12 February 2013, Previti v. Italy, CE:ECHR:2013: 
0212DEC000184508 and judgment of the ECHR of 22  September 2015, Borcea v. Romania, 
CE:ECHR:2015:0922DEC005595914. 
37 The principle of legality is foreseen in Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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defendant are observed. National courts remain free to apply the national 
standards of protection of such rights, provided that the EU level of protec-
tion is not compromised. 
The referring court argued that the principle of legality would be 
infringed if the provisions of the criminal code were disapplied in the 
current case since, before Tarico I, the defendant could not foresee that 
Article 325 TFEU required the court to disapply the limitation provisions. 
Furthermore, the Italian court considered that it was unable to define the 
particular circumstances in which it would have to disapply the national 
provisions, in accordance with the CJ’s decision, without exceeding the 
limits imposed on its discretion. 
After recalling the importance of the principle of legality attributed both 
by EU legal order and by the national legal systems of the Member States, 
the CJ considered that, since at the time of the main proceedings the rules 
on limitation periods regarding VAT fraud had not been harmonised by 
EU legislation, Italy was free to provide that rules on limitation periods 
formed part of its substantive law and were therefore subject to the princi-
ple that offences and penalties must be defined by law. The CJ then left to 
the national court the task of ascertaining whether the application of the 
Taricco I decision would lead to a situation of uncertainty, regarding the 
determination of the applicable limitation rules, which would amount to a 
violation of the principle of legality. If that were to be the case, the national 
court was not required to disapply the provisions of its criminal code, even 
if such disapplication would allow a national situation incompatible with 
EU law to be remedied.38 
(B)  The legal nature of rules on the effects of administrative or judicial 
decisions 
Regarding the question of the nature of norms regulating the effects of 
administrative or judicial decisions, under Portuguese law they form part 
of what is called direito probatório (law of evidence). Direito probatório 
contains both substantive and procedural rules. Portuguese scholars tend 
to qualify as substantive norms relating to the burden, admissibility or 
value of proof, and as formal or procedural those that regulate how the 
38 The CJ also remarks that, in any case, the provisions of the Italian criminal code cannot be dis-
applied in relation to persons accused of committing VAT infringements before the delivery of the 
Taricco I judgement, otherwise they would be made retroactively subject to conditions of criminal 
liability stricter than those that were in force at the time that the infringement was committed. 
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means of proof can be requested, submitted or presented in court. In order 
to avoid any doubts, the Portuguese legislator, in the act implementing the 
Directive, clearly stated that the rules relating to the burden of proof were 
to be considered as substantive rules.39
(C) Nature of legal rules: a matter to be decided by EU or national law?
In the AG’s opinion, “the norms of articles 9 [effect of national decisions] 
and 10 [limitation periods] of Directive 2014/104, now under discussion, 
are not purely procedural rules”40. No justification was offered by the 
AG as to why norms on effects of decisions are of a substantive nature. 
Regarding the nature of rules on limitation periods, the AG, relying on the 
second Taricco decision, declared that since limitation rules had not been 
harmonised at the time, Portugal was free to qualify such rules as forming 
part of substantive law. 
In our humble view, this is a weak spot in the AG’s reasoning. 
Understandably, the Taricco saga casted a shadow over this decision; 
however, we believe that, regarding this specific point, the analogy with 
the Italian case is not entirely possible. Before we tackle the question of 
whether the modification of the limitation period, regarding the right to 
claim damages, violates the principle of legality, we have to decide whether 
the Directive is applicable to the case. In particular, it is necessary to deter-
mine what norms of the Directive can be applied retroactively and what 
norms the Directive prevents from applying retroactively. While it is true 
that, before the matter was harmonised, Portugal was free to determine 
the nature of its internal norms regulating the said issues, Portuguese legal 
order, or that of any other Member State, cannot play a role in determining 
the nature of the norms of the Directive itself. 
Article 22 (1) of the Directive expressly refers to the national measures 
adopted to comply with the “substantive provisions of this Directive”. In 
other words, what matters is not the nature of the national implementation 
measures, but the nature of the provisions of the Directive. The qualifica-
tion of these norms as procedural or substantive is logically a matter to 
be decided by EU law. It makes no sense to leave this qualification to the 
internal legal order of the various Member States, which will inevitably 
39 Article 24 of Law 23/2018 of 6 of June 2018. 
40 § 61. 
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offer distinct and incompatible answers, thereby affecting the harmonisa-
tion aims of the Directive, at least during a significant period of time.
Admittedly, the problem resides in the equivocal wording of Article 22. 
Interpretative doubts could have been avoided if, instead of merely refer-
ring to the “procedural and substantive” provisions of the Directive, the 
EU legislator had listed the norms that were to be applied retroactively. 
Predictably, when transposing the Directive, Member States did not 
take into account EU case-law (which in any case is scarce and not entirely 
clear) to decide which norms of the Directive were capable of retroactive 
application. Instead, most Member States merely replicated the wording of 
Article 22 or adopted very similar ambiguous provisions. In practice, this 
means that each national legal order will use its internal legal methods to 
interpret the nature of the norms of the Directive, leading to a high level 
of hidden heterogeneity in the transposition measures, reducing trans-
parency and generating legal uncertainty.41 Furthermore, many Member 
States have specified the temporal scope of all or some of the provisions of 
the new regime in ways that contradict each other or the EU judicature’s 
case law.42
As commented by Rodger, B. et al, the Directive’s temporal scope “proved 
to be one of the most divisive issues in the transposition of the Directive”, 
as the broad and imprecise drafting of the norm provides “limited use-
ful guidance”.43 According to the authors, uniformity in the application 
of EU law regarding this matter can only be achieved if the CJ intervenes, 
through preliminary rulings, to impose a harmonious interpretation. On 
the contrary, if the Court followed the AG’s suggestion and left to the MS 
the qualification of the Directive’s norms according to their legal tradi-
tions, it would only be adding ambiguity to an already unclear rule.
Making matters worse, the problem of determining the nature of the 
norms does not concern limitation periods only. The nature of the rules 
on the effect of national decisions is also not clear. And even though they 
were not at issue in this particular case, interpretative doubts regarding 
the temporal application of the Directive might also arise in relation to 
41 Barry Rodger, Miguel Sousa Ferro and Francisco Marcos, “Transposition context, process, 
measures and scope”, in The EU Antitrust Damages Directive Transposition in the Member States, 
ed. Barry Rodger, Miguel Sousa Ferro and Francisco Marcos (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018), 434.
42 Ibidem, 434.
43 Ibidem, 433. 
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norms dealing with disclosure of evidence and consequences for failing to 
cooperate with national courts, jurisdictional provisions, as well as other 
rules dealing with the burden of proof.44 
The CJ’s decision in Cogeco, however, does not provide us with a univer-
sal solution, as envisaged by the abovementioned authors, capable of being 
applied in all jurisdictions and drawing to a halt any interpretive doubts 
that may arise regarding the Directive’s temporal scope. The decision in 
Cogeco is rather an ad hoc clarification, tailored to the specific case of the 
Portuguese legal order. The CJ, instead of providing a decisive answer on 
the nature of the norms on limitation periods, artfully adopted a decision 
which managed to avoid this prickly question altogether. According to the 
CJ, the Directive was not, in any event, applicable ratione temporis to the 
dispute in the main proceedings.45 If the norms of the Directive on limita-
tion periods were to be considered as substantive norms, they could not be 
applied to the case, since the Directive prevents their retroactive applica-
tion.46 But the same conclusion would be reached if the norms were consid-
ered to be procedural in nature. This is because Article 22 (2) precludes the 
application of procedural norms to actions for damages lodged before the 
Directive came into force. This means that “Member States enjoyed a meas-
ure of discretion in deciding, when transposing that directive, whether the 
national rules intended to transpose the directive’s procedural provisions 
would apply to actions for damages brought after 26 December 2014 but 
before the date of transposition of that directive or, at the latest, before the 
expiry of the period prescribed for its transposition”. 
According to the Portuguese implementation act, procedural norms 
are not applicable to cases where the court was seized prior to the date 
in which the Portuguese implementing act came into force,47 which only 
happened in August 2018. Cogeco’s action for damages was brought on 
44 Ibidem, 434-435. For instance, whereas in general, rules on presumptions are seen as proce-
dural in nature (see Aistė Mickonytė, Presumption of Innocence in EU Anti-Cartel Enforcement 
(Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2019), 6) and the CJ has qualified them as such (see Judgment of 18 December 
2014, CA Consumer Finance v. Ingrid Bakkausburden et al., C-449/13, EU:C:2014:2464, paragraphs 
22-23, where the Court qualified as procedural a rule dealing with the burden of proof that the 
creditor had fulfilled its obligations), Portugal, in its implementation act, specifically refers to rules 
on the burden of proof as substantial (see Article 24 no. 1 of Lei 23/2018 of 6 June 2018).
45 § 33. 
46 § 26 and 30.
47 Article 24 (2) of Law 23/2018. 
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February 2015, before the expiry of the deadline to transpose the Directive 
and before its transposition into the Portuguese legal order. Thus, logically, 
the procedural norms also fail to apply ratione temporis. 
IV.  The Portuguese limitation period and the principle of 
effectiveness
The Directive was deemed to be inapplicable to the case, but the CJ still 
had to address the question of the compatibility of a norm such as Article 
498 no. 1 of the Portuguese Civil Code with EU law, in particular with 
Article 102 TFEU and the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. 
As mentioned above, Article 498 of the Civil Code establishes a three 
year limitation period which starts regardless of whether the claimant 
knows the identity of the infringer or the total extension of the damages, 
and there is no specific norm foreseeing the possibility of suspending or 
interrupting the limitation period for the duration of proceedings follow-
ing which a final decision is made by the national competition authority 
or by a review court.
To answer this question, the CJ started by recalling that Article 102 pro-
duces direct effect in relations between individuals. Furthermore, the full 
effect of Article 102 would be compromised if anyone who has suffered 
damages from an abuse of dominant position could not exercise their right 
to claim damages. Since the Directive was inapplicable, it is for the domes-
tic legal system to regulate the exercise to claim damages, in observance 
with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.
It is clear that Article 498 of the Civil Code does not disregard the prin-
ciple of equivalence since it is applicable to claims for damages regardless 
of whether they result from an infringement of national or EU competi-
tion law. But its compatibility with the principle of effectiveness is more 
problematic.48 
The principle of effectiveness dictates that national rules cannot render 
the exercise of an EU right impossible or excessively difficult. In this case, 
they cannot jeopardise the effective application of Article 102. In order to 
decide if this was the case, the CJ deemed necessary to take into considera-
tion all the elements of the Portuguese limitation rules.
The CJ did not specifically address the matter of whether a limitation 
period of three years – solely on account of its duration – infringes the 
48 § 54. 
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principle of effectiveness. The AG, however, affirmed that a norm estab-
lishing a limitation period of three years did not violate the said principle. 
The AG considered it to be a sufficiently long delay for the claimant to exer-
cise his right. A limitation period of three years did not render the exercise 
of such right impossible or excessively difficult. 
What the CJ considered more problematic was the fact that the limi-
tation period starts to run before the injured person is able to ascertain 
the identity of the infringer49 and the fact that the limitation period can-
not be suspended or interrupted for the duration of proceedings before 
the national competition authority or the review court.50 The CJ came to 
the conclusion that “a limitation period of three years […], which, first, 
starts to run from the date on which the injured party was aware of its 
right to compensation, even if the infringer is not known and, secondly, 
may not be suspended or interrupted in the course of proceedings before 
the national competition authority, renders the exercise of the right to full 
compensation practically impossible or excessively difficult”.51
V. Irrelevance of the question on effects of decisions
Regarding the question of compatibility with Article 102 and the princi-
ple of effectiveness of a norm, such as the Article 623 of the PCCP, on 
the effects of a definitive decision of the national competition authority, 
the AG had held that the exercise of the right to claim damages would be 
rendered extremely difficult if no effects were attributed to an infringe-
ment decision of the competition authority. According to the AG, consid-
ering the complexity of competition law infringements and the difficulties 
the claimant faces to prove them, the principle of effectiveness dictates 
that definitive infringement decisions of the competition authority have 
to serve, at least, as an indicator regarding the existence of the respective 
infringement.52 The principle of effectiveness does not, however, require 
49 According to the AG, even though it is indispensable to know the identity of the infringer to 
bring a successful action for damages, this task is frequently more complex in the realm of com-
petition law, where infringers are usually legal persons who are members of complex corporate 
groups hardly comprehensible for the external observer. § 84 of the Opinion. 
50 On this issue, the AG points to the fact that a correct legal appreciation of a competition law 
infringement involves, very frequently, the analysis of complex economic situations and internal 
commercial documents which are brought to light through the investigation carried out by the 
competition authorities. § 85 of the Opinion. 
51 § 53.
52 § 93.
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the attribution of binding effects to the final decisions of the competition 
authority. Accordingly, an interpretation of Article 623 PCCP that does 
not recognise any effects to a final infringement decision of the PCA is 
incompatible with the principle of effectiveness, but an interpretation of 
Article 623 of the PCCP, which considers that decisions of the competition 
authority create a rebuttable presumption regarding the existence of an 
infringement, are not incompatible with Article 102 TFEU and the princi-
ple of effectiveness. 
The CJ, however, refused to rule on this question. As described above, 
the decision of the PCA was partially annulled by the Competition Court 
on the grounds that the defendant had not infringed Article 102 TFEU, 
and this decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal. This means that 
the subject matter in the main proceedings is not an action for damages 
following a final decision finding an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. 
The question was thus considered inadmissible since the interpretation of 
the principle of effectiveness and the Treaty and their compatibility with 
national legislation bore no relation to the actual facts in the main action.53 
VI. Implications of the CJ’s decision in the main proceedings
Notwithstanding the CJ’s conclusion that a norm such as Article 498 of the 
Civil Code could render the exercise of the right to claim compensation 
for damages caused by EU competition law infringements impossible or 
excessively difficult, the limitation period foreseen in the article might still 
be applicable by the national court to the case at hand. 
First of all, it remains to be decided if there was an infringement of 
Article 102 TFEU. If the national court finds that the plaintiff’s abusive 
conduct was not capable of affecting trade between Member States, and 
there is therefore only an infringement of national competition law, there 
is no reason not to apply the limitation regime foreseen in Article 498 of 
the Civil Code in its integrity. The CJ’s ruling only applies if there was an 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU. It is clear from the wording of the CJ’s 
decision that the principle of effectiveness does not dictate this solution if 
the case is restricted to the realm of national competition law. 
Secondly, in this case, at least at a first glance, there seem to be no prob-
lems regarding the identification of the infringer. The PCA initiated its 
investigation after a complaint against the conduct of Sport TV was filed 
53 Paragraphs 56-60.
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by Cabovisão, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cogeco. It seems therefore 
highly likely that Cogeco knew who the infringer was from the outset of 
the infringement period. The case deals with an abuse of dominant posi-
tion stemming from a distribution contract signed between the two par-
ties. Furthermore, in cases of abusive conduct, by definition, the infringer 
can be no other than the company holding the dominant position. There 
were also no issues of succession, transmission or complex group restruc-
turings that could leave the injured party in doubt about the infringer’s 
identity. 
Finally, while it is true that in the Portuguese legal order there is no norm 
specifically foreseeing the suspension or the interruption of the limitation 
period during proceedings before the national competition authority, it 
is possible, through a mechanism called “notificação judicial avulsa”, to 
interrupt the limitation period. This mechanism, established in Article 323 
of the Portuguese Civil Code, allows the creditor to interrupt the limita-
tion period through a judicial notification or writ expressing the creditor’s 
intention to exercise his right in the future. 
In conclusion, even if the national court finds that there was an infringe-
ment of Article 102 TFEU, it should still be able to apply the limitation 
rules foreseen in the Portuguese Civil Code, since, in this specific case, 
the principle of effectiveness does not seem capable of hampering their 
application. 
VII. A brief comment on parent company liability
This case warrants some comments on the controversial problem of parent 
company liability, even though this issue does not form part of the conten-
tious matter before the courts. 
In EU competition law undertakings are defined as economic, rather 
than legal, units. Accordingly, the scope of an undertaking does not neces-
sarily coincide with that of a legal entity. An undertaking might not have 
legal personality or it might be composed of several natural or legal per-
sons. In practical terms, this means that a parent company might be held 
liable for an infringement committed by a subsidiary, if they are deemed to 
form part of the same single economic entity. The crucial criterion to deter-
mine whether several entities form a single undertaking is whether these 
entities display a unified conduct on the market. According to settled EU 
case-law, attribution of liability to a parent company for an infringement 
committed by a subsidiary depends on the fulfilment of two conditions: 
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(i) the parent company is in a position that enables it to exercise decisive 
influence and (ii) decisive influence was in fact exercised.54
In Portugal, even though the Portuguese Competition Act55 defines 
“undertaking” according to EU case-law, recognising that an undertaking 
might comprise different legal entities,56 the PCA, prior to the Directive’s 
implementation, tended to apply fines only to the subsidiaries who were 
directly involved in the infringement, rather than to their parent compa-
nies, even when the entities constituted a single undertaking.57 The PCA’s 
choice to fine only the subsidiaries seemed to be based on policy considera-
tions and resulted from the national courts’ refusal in attributing vicarious 
liability to parent companies. National courts, which hold very conserva-
tive views, prefer to rely on internal doctrines of criminal law regarding 
the concept of infringer and the principle of non-transmissibility of guilt.58 
Despite, or perhaps due to, the jurisdictional reluctance to apply the EU 
concept of economic unit and parent company liability, the PCA59, when 
drafting the transposition proposal of the Private Enforcement Directive, 
introduced a provision establishing the civil liability of the undertaking as 
a single economic unit.
54 On the subject see Alison Jones, “The boundaries of an undertaking in EU competition law”, 
European Competition Journal 8, no. 2 (2012): 301-331; Andriani Kalintri, “Revisiting paren-
tal liability in EU competition law”, European Law Review 43, no. 2 (2018): 145-166; Okeoghene 
Odudu and David Bailey, “The single economic entity in EU competition law”, Common Market 
Law Review 51 (2014): 1721-1758; Stefan Thomas, “Guilty of a fault that one has not committed. The 
limits of the group-based sanction policy carried out by the Commission and the European courts 
in EU-antitrust law”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 3, no. 1 (2012):11-28; Wouter 
Wils, “The undertaking as subject of E.C. competition law and the imputation of infringements to 
natural or legal persons”, European Law Review 25, no. 2 (2000): 99-116.
55 Law 19/2012 of 8 of May, Diário da República no. 89/2012, I of 2012-05-08.
56 Article 3 no. 2 of the Portuguese Competition Act: “A group of undertakings is deemed to be a 
single undertaking, even if the undertakings themselves are legally separate entities, where such 
undertakings make up an economic unit or maintain interdependence ties deriving specifically 
from the following: a) The undertaking so defined has a majority of the share capital; b) It has more 
than half of the voting rights conferred by the share capital; c) It has the power to appoint more 
than half of the members of the board of directors or the supervisory board; d) It has the necessary 
powers to manage the businesses of the group and of each of its undertakings”. 
57 Ana de Oliveira and Miguel Sousa Ferro, “The sins of the son: Parent company liability for com-
petition law infringements”, Revista da Concorrência e Regulação 1, no. 3 (2010): 75. 
58 Tribunal de Comércio de Lisboa, 2 of May 2007, 965/06.9TYLSB; Tribunal da Concorrência, 
Regulação e Supervisão, 20 of October 2016, 45/13.OYUSTR; Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa, 14 of 
June 2017, 36/16.0YUSTR.L1.
59 In Portugal, the Ministry of Economy entrusted the drafting of the transposition proposal to the 
PCA. See Article 3 of Portuguese Act implementing the Private Enforcement Directive
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Interestingly, in this case, the EU concept of undertaking is applied to 
both sides of the dispute. Regarding the defendant, even though the deci-
sion of the PCA was solely addressed to Sport TV, the action for damages 
was also filed against its shareholders (Controlinvest-SGPS, SA and NOS-
SGPS, SA). Regarding the injured party, the company that directly suffered 
damages was the subsidiary – Cabovisão, nonetheless, the main proceed-
ings were initiated by its parent company – Cogeco, who is thereby rely-
ing on the EU concept of undertaking. The question then arises whether 
Cabovisão can initiate its own claim for damages regarding this same 
infringement or whether this represents a violation of the principle of non 
bis in idem.60 
VIII. Concluding remarks 
The CJ ruling in Cogeco does not fully eliminate all the interpretative 
doubts regarding the Directive’s temporal application. This decision does 
not put an end to all the potential uncertainties that can stem from the 
ambiguous and unclear wording of Article 22 of the Directive. It is there-
fore possible that in the next few years there will be more preliminary rul-
ings, not only in relation to limitation periods regarding infringements 
that occurred before the Directive entered into force, but also regarding 
other norms whose nature is not entirely clear or which are heterogene-
ously qualified by the different Member States. 
Furthermore, even if there are no doubts regarding its temporal appli-
cability, authors have pointed out that the Directive does not solve inter-
pretation issues regarding limitation periods completely. There are, in par-
ticular, difficulties in determining when the claimant can reasonably be 
expected to know about the subjective conditions that trigger the limita-
tion period. When should the conditions for such legal fiction be consid-
ered as actually fulfilled? Is it (i) when the media publishes news about the 
infringement; (ii) when the competition authority initiates its inquiry; (iii) 
when the competition authority publishes the statement of objections or 
the infringement decision; (iv) or the moment when that decision can no 
longer be appealed?61 And the determination of this moment is even more 
60 In fact, Cabovisão has initiated an action for damages against Sport TV but the proceedings are 
currently suspended awaiting the final decision in the Cogeco case. 
61 Vlahek and Podobnik, “Provisions of the Damages Directive on Limitation Periods”: 156-157. 
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difficult in cases where there was no public enforcement activity.62 It will 
be interesting to see how national courts handle this issue.
In terms of the impact of the Court’s ruling in this particular case, as we 
have seen, everything will depend on whether the national court decides 
to apply Article 102 TFEU to the case. And even if it decides so, the general 
limitation period foreseen in the Portuguese Civil Code might still apply 
since, in this particular case, there were no issues regarding the identifica-
tion of the infringer and it was actually possible to interrupt the limita-
tion period. We are also curious to see whether the Portuguese court will 
unprecedentedly accept to impute liability to the parent companies for an 
abuse of dominant position committed by their subsidiaries or whether it 
will uphold the defendant’s plea regarding the lack of locus standi of the 
parent companies. 
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